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The Danish Flexicurity Model
The Danish flexicurity model is generally regarded 
as a central component of Denmark’s welfare re-
gime. Through liberal dismissal regulations, high 
unemployment benefits and active labour market 
policies, a mobile and well-functioning labour mar-
ket system has been institutionalized as an integral 
part of the Danish welfare state, benefitting both so-
cial partners (Andersen & Mailand 2005; Bredgaard 
& Kongshøj Madsen 2015; Jensen 2017; Kongshøj 
Madsen 2008). In its basic definition, the flexicurity 
model is the institutional system that on the one 
hand allows employers to easily hire and fire, and 
on the other hand guarantees employees financial 
security through high unemployment benefits and 
higher probability of re-employment; employers do 
not fear difficulties or high costs related to firing 
employees. While these two components are consid-
ered to be the main axes of the Danish flexicurity 
model, the model possesses a third component: ac-
tive labour market policies. These serve to redirect 
the unemployed into the labour market, increasing 
the likelihood of re-employment (Kongshøj Madsen 
2008). Flexicurity thus manages to navigate between 
a capitalist market economy and a demand for social 
justice and safety: 
The fundamental idea behind the concept of 
flexicurity is that flexibility and security are not 
contradictory to one another, but in many situ-
ations can be mutually supportive. Furthermore, 
flexibility is not the monopoly of the employers, 
The Danish flexicurity model is widely acknowledged and even advocated by the European Com-
mission as a measure to achieve economic progress without compromising basic social conditions. 
It is therefore paradoxical that over the past decades the security component of the flexicurity 
model has faced steady retrenchments, jeopardizing its overall balance. The article applies a his-
torical approach to understanding the transformation that has given way to a weakened position 
of workers in society, and asserts that the changes of the flexicurity model have been conditioned 
by the disappearance of the view of the “working class” as a potential threat to societal peace – a 
change closely connected to the waning of an alternative to capitalism and the related opportunity 
for a spread of neoliberal political economy. 
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just as security is not the monopoly of the em-
ployees. […] So, the foundation is there for a 
new interaction between flexibility and security, 
which stresses the potential for win-win outcomes 
in situations, which are traditionally conceived as 
characterised by conflicting interests. (Kongshøj 
Madsen 2008: 3)
The security component of the Danish flexicurity 
model, with an increased focus on minimizing the 
deficits of unemployment, was built from the begin-
ning of the twentieth century and especially priori-
tized in the post-war welfare regime. The model is 
closely related to the structure of the so-called Dan-
ish Model, characterized by (relatively) indepen-
dently acting social partners that act through mu-
tual recognition (Due & Madsen 1993; Due, Madsen 
& Jensen 1993; Jensen 2015). In 1899, the labour 
unions and the employers’ organisations agreed on 
the so-called September Compromise, as the Danish 
workers accepted employers’ right to liberally hire 
and fire employees. In return, workers were allowed 
to organize and were acknowledged as a collec-
tive actor with the mandate to negotiate wages and 
work conditions that were settled through collective 
agreements (Ibsen & Jørgensen 1978; Jensen 2015; 
Jul Nielsen 2002). The Danish Model thus can be 
seen as a dynamic institutional arrangement, which 
constitutes the Danish industrial relations system, 
as the model is built on negotiation between social 
partners to reach collective agreements.1 An impor-
tant characteristic of the Danish Model has been 
that the percentage of organized workers has been 
large, and this has provided the system with a high 
level of legitimacy. However, similar to what can be 
observed across Europe (Strøby Jensen 2004), weak-
ened Danish unions have experienced slowly declin-
ing membership rates, from 73 percent in 1995 to 67 
percent in 2010; if the membership of the increas-
ingly successful yellow unions (comparable to mere 
insurance agencies and not involved in agreement 
negotiations) is deducted, the decline in the same 
period is from 71 percent to 61 percent (Due, Pihl 
& Madsen 2010: 19). Although memberships are 
still relatively high compared to other countries, the 
prospect of a continuous decline points to a loss of 
critical mass that will eventually jeopardize the le-
gitimacy of the trade unions as a basic pillar of la-
bour market regulation.
Flexicurity and the EU
Flexicurity has won international recognition be-
cause it combines market efficiency with social con-
cerns.2 Though flexicurity can take many forms,3 it 
was the Danish version of it that the EU Commis-
sion regarded as the ideal when it adopted flexicurity 
as a key concept within the European Employment 
strategy in 2006–2007 (Jensen 2017), as “a crucial 
element in modernising the EU’s labour market” 
(Eur-Lex 2007a). The following excerpt reveals the 
reason behind the acknowledgment of the Danish 
flexicurity model:
The Danish labour market shows a successful 
combination of flexibility and security, offering 
flexible labour laws and relatively low job protec-
tion, extensive efforts on lifelong learning and ac-
tive labour market policies, and a generous social 
security system. (Eur-Lex 2007b)
By 2006, the European Commission had adopted 
the concept of flexicurity, regarding it to be an in-
strumental element in EU’s goal to create both social 
cohesion and a competitive labour market. As José 
Manuel Barroso stated in 2006 at the Year of Work-
ers’ Mobility Launch Conference, “This concept of 
‘flexicurity’ is a way of ensuring that employers and 
workers feel they have the flexibility, but also the se-
curity they need” (Keune & Jepsen 2007: 8).
Flexicurity is thus regarded by the European Uni-
on as a model that makes it possible to maintain 
popular support for liberal dismissal policies. And 
as the following excerpt shows, Denmark is regarded 
as a prime example of how flexicurity can be carried 
out successfully:
The Dutch and Danish experience are interpret-
ed as proof that alternative approaches to simple 
deregulation can be successful in providing high 
levels of flexibility, without this being at the cost 
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of increased workers’ insecurity. Hence, flexicurity 
would offer options for a market with a human 
face, fitting European varieties of capitalism better 
than the deregulation approach which dominates 
American capitalism. (Keune & Jepsen 2007: 6)
Given the widespread acknowledgement of the Dan-
ish flexicurity model, it stands out as a paradox that 
the security component of it has come increasingly 
under strain (Andersen, Mailand & Ibsen 2012; Jul 
Nielsen 2004; Jørgensen 2011; Kongshøj Madsen 
2011).4 In the following sections, we will examine the 
underlying historical transformations that we argue 
are pivotal to understanding such a development as 
more than merely a superficial outcome of economic 
fluctuations (culminating with the financial crisis in 
2008). First, we turn to a brief historical account of 
the development in unemployment benefits as one 
of the basic security components of the Danish flexi-
curity model. We do not intend to make a compre-
hensive analysis of the entire security dimension of 
flexicurity in the Danish context, which would entail 
a detailed account of the spectrum of active labour 
market policies and the relationship between these 
policies and unemployment benefits (where devel-
opment of the former in line with neoliberal reason-
ing could be advocated to partially replace the with-
drawal of the latter). Rather, our aim is to illustrate 
how the historical development of unemployment 
benefits illuminates a shift in the approach to social 
welfare.
Theoretical and Methodological Foundation
As a basis for our argumentation throughout the ar-
ticle, we will briefly present key components of its 
applied theoretical framework, as gazing through 
this lens enables an understanding of the underlying 
foundation for the further analysis of the macropo-
litical transitions that have resulted in the changing 
conditions for the Danish flexicurity model. 
The theoretical lens that this article applies is 
the ethnological state and life-mode theory, which 
parallels neo-Marxist scholarship and is aligned 
with social scientists and ethnologists such as Bose-
rup (1986), Højrup (2003), Kaspersen (2012), and 
Kaspersen and Gabriel (2005). Through different 
terminologies these scholars perceive the state as a 
subject, and the social groups within the states as 
life-modes (Højrup’s terminology, see later) that are 
understood as dependent subjects whose conditions 
of existence rely on state recognition. The approach 
applies the German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel’s con-
cept of recognition to explain how a relation of mutu-
al recognition between states determines the state’s 
external position. A state must be strong enough to 
be recognized by the other states in the state-system. 
This strength is rooted internally in the individual 
state: in the army, the civil society, the economy, 
the institutional systems etc. The state’s struggle for 
recognition in the state-system is therefore closely 
connected to the internal landscape of the state, this 
implying that the dependent subjects’ conditions of 
existence are realized on the state’s premises, serving 
as a means to the state’s survival (for a detailed ac-
count of this way of employing a Hegelian inspired 
conceptual hierarchy, see Højrup 2003). Obviously, 
social practices are not necessarily initiated “from 
above”; but if they jeopardize the principal concerns 
of the state, they will not endure, or the state will 
collapse. The rise of a conscious labour population 
in the late nineteenth century is an example of a 
movement “from below”, which, following resist-
ance from the state, was split in a complex process 
into a politically recognized part (evolving into la-
bour unions, political parties and other organisa-
tions) and non-recognized factions (radical anti-
system organisations and groups) that were regarded 
as destabilizing to the state (Jul Nielsen 2002).
To understand how the external struggle for recog-
nition is related to the way in which workers as a 
social group have been handled within the Danish 
state in different periods, this article applies a meth-
odology of historical analysis. Hereby it is illumi-
nated how developments in the external milieu of 
the Danish state have conditioned different internal 
perceptions and priorities of social groups against 
the background of larger political and economic 
transformations. In the ethnological endeavour to 
understand the principal relation between ways of 
living and the conditions on which these are based, a 
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historical analysis can illuminate how and why basic 
living conditions for particular life-modes undergo 
a transformation.
Unemployment Benefits under Strain
Danish unemployment benefits have suffered severe 
retrenchments over the past decades. Unemployment 
benefits peaked in the mid-1970s and have since then 
declined gradually (Mailand 2010). In essence, the 
Danish unemployment benefits are constituted by 
three components: (1) the degree to which the bene-
fits cover the original wage of the unemployed; (2) 
the amount of time during which the unemployed is 
entitled to receive benefits; (3) the temporal require-
ments for accruing the right to receive unemploy-
ment benefits. Since the early 1980s, all three have 
been drastically cut back. An analysis made in 2004 
by the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) 
showed that compensations since 1982 had been re-
duced by 25 percent. With the labour market reform 
in 1993–94, the period in which one could receive 
unemployment benefits was fixed at seven years, 
from a previously de facto unlimited time period, 
while continuous retrenchments followed until 1999 
when it was fixed at four years. In the 1990s, the op-
position and the unions accepted these reductions in 
unemployment benefit period because they received 
extended active labour market initiatives in return. 
For instance in 1996, when the unemployment bene-
fit period was reduced to five years, full time activa-
tion was imposed after two years of unemployment 
(Mailand 2010: 6).
The financial crisis in 2008 took its toll on the 
Danish economy, as it did across Europe. From an 
unemployment rate close to structural unemploy-
ment (3.4 percent) prior to the crisis, the unem-
ployment rate was doubled in 2010. With the un-
employment benefit reform (Dagpengereformen) in 
2010, severe amendments were made to the Danish 
unemployment benefits. The period of receiving 
benefits was halved from four to two years, while 
the accruing requirement (genoptjeningskravet) was 
doubled: the work requirement went from 26 weeks 
within three years to at least 52 weeks within three 
years (Mailand 2015). Although the continuous re-
trenchments have caused public debate and political 
controversies in the left and right, the downward 
tendency has been almost independent of the po-
litical leanings of the government in power. Thus, 
when a centre-left government took over in 2011, it 
restricted itself to implementing acute and tempo-
rary policies to ease the immediate negative effects 
from a recent reform made by the previous adminis-
tration, rather than policies with the overall aim of 
reversing reductions from previous years. In other 
words, the established view across political parties 
(with the exception of those to the far political left) 
has been to use flexibility to meet market demands, 
pushing security concerns to the side-line. 
What we argue – by examining unemployment 
benefits – is that an aggravation of the security 
component of the flexicurity model does not stand 
alone as evidence of a weakened labour side. It is 
closely connected with a decline in influence of the 
Danish trade unions (the background of which we 
will return to). Several concrete political initiatives 
since the millennium have had direct influence on 
the unions’ conditions. In 2002, the Danish gov-
ernment, for instance, implemented an act that dis-
solved the bonds between a particular unemploy-
ment fund and a particular trade union, allowing 
for the yellow unions to flourish (Kjellberg & Ibsen 
2016). In 2006, in addition, it implemented an act 
that abolished the right to let employment be condi-
tioned by membership in a particular trade union. 
These initiatives among others have resulted in de-
clines in membership from the red unions; and even 
during the latest social democratic government, the 
relationship to the unions was close to the breaking 
point (Jensen 2017).
It is relevant to include another example of how 
the general framework of worker protection has 
undergone a transition. The European open border 
system – embedded in the Schengen agreement and 
the tenets of the four freedoms (freedom of capital, 
commodities, services and labour) – has brought 
about an increased competition that severely impacts 
worker livelihoods. With the addition of ten new 
countries during the EU enlargement in 2004 (in-
cluding eight from the former Eastern bloc), work-
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ers from low-wage and high-wage countries became 
part of the same labour market. The open border 
system provided the former with new opportunities 
abroad, while the latter were subjected to competi-
tion of a kind that had been avoided for decades due 
to influential labour organisations. As Randall Han-
sen – focusing on West Germany, Great Britain and 
France but arguing it to be a pattern applying also to 
other Northern European countries – has illustrat-
ed: when the first afterwar waves of labour migration 
were seen in the 1960s, strong labour unions in the 
receiving countries had the power to safeguard that 
the guest-workers were granted wage and working 
conditions equal to the domestic workers, that they 
were generally integrated in the unionized system, 
and that they managed to curb the influx to limited 
quotas (Hansen 2003). That labour migration since 
the 1990s has managed to stress job security, wages 
and working conditions (Andreß & Lohmann 2008; 
Favell 2008, 2009; Friberg 2012; Jul Nielsen & Sand-
berg 2014; Lubanski 1999; Stan & Erne 2016; Stand-
ing 2011) reveals a much weaker and less influential 
labour agenda that has lost the political support it 
had half a century ago. In Denmark since 2004, the 
number of so-called Eastern workers (from the for-
mer Eastern bloc countries) has continued to rise, 
thereby challenging conditions within sectors with 
low-skilled jobs such as construction, cleaning and 
agriculture (Andersen & Felbo-Kolding 2013; An-
dersen & Pedersen 2007; Bræmer & Redder 2017; Jul 
Nielsen 2016; Andersen & Arnholz 2007).
Thus, we argue that the changes witnessed during 
the previous decades in the Danish flexicurity mod-
el are symptoms of a principal transformation of 
the recognition of workers as a particular societal 
group, and not merely of shifting currents of po-
litical orientation. In the following section, we ex-
amine two macropolitical changes that have taken 
place during the twentieth century, which, we argue, 
can be understood as catalysts for the retrenchments 
that have been imposed on the security component 
of the Danish flexicurity model since the 1980s. Al-
though we mainly focus on Danish material here, 
and specifically on the Danish flexicurity model, we 
see these transformations as evidence of an overall 
decline of labour influence that has taken place not 
only in Denmark but also across Europe (Andreß & 
Lohmann 2008; Standing 2011; Strøby Jensen 2004).
Bringing in a Historical Perspective on the 
Political Economy and Theorizing “Class” 
The first systemic change has been a paradigmatic 
shift from a Keynesian to a neoliberal paradigm in 
the political economy, beginning with the Thatcher 
era in the late 1970s. The term neoliberalism is am-
biguous; in some cases it refers narrowly to a mac-
roeconomic doctrine, while in others it is used as a 
broad reference to capitalism and global inequalities. 
In the present article we see it as a form of political 
economy that favours deregulation, free trade, pri-
vatization and other regulatory forms that are based 
on market logic, which implies that a market is not 
understood as a pre-social form but rather as a po-
litical creation (Harvey 2005; Wacquant 2012: 71). 
Accordingly, just like politics matter in a neoliberal 
regime, liberal currents played an important role 
during the era of (what could generally be referred to 
as) Keynesianism. This era also embraced a diversity 
of specific regimes, ranging for example from the 
social democratic systems of Scandinavia with (rela-
tively) independently acting social partners to more 
corporatist models of continental Europe. Despite 
the variety of forms, neoliberalism emerged as the 
anti-thesis to the Keynesian regimes, highlighting 
the idea of the free possessive individual as a contrast 
to state-led social engineering (S. Hall 2011: 706). 
We will later return to what could be argued to be a 
paradigmatic shift to a neoliberal political econo my 
during the 1970s and 1980s. For the moment, it is 
relevant to reiterate that this shift, along with a gen-
eral pressure on the European welfare states from 
an increasingly globalized economy, has given rise, 
since the 1980s, to a slow but steady challenge to the 
voice of labour. Through the discursive agenda set 
by a neoliberal paradigm, it is generally perceived as 
less and less legitimate, both economically and so-
cially, to provide social security on a collective basis. 
Another principal macropolitical change – and 
arguably also an important condition for the spread 
of neoliberalism – during the previous half century 
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has been the gradual diminishing of the “working 
class” as a potential political threat. Without en-
gaging in a lengthy exposé concerning the concept 
of the “working class”5, it is nevertheless appropri-
ate to relate the theoretical framework employed in 
the present article to the way in which the notion of 
“class” has played a role in both academia and the 
public discourse. State and life-mode theory that has 
been developed since the 1980s is rooted in a Marx-
ian framework (Højrup 2003). The concept of mode 
of production and thus people’s distinct relation to 
“processes of production and the disposition of the 
product” (Carrier 2015: 29) are regarded as key to an 
understanding of reproducible ways of living: life-
modes. Notably, unlike many Marxist usages of the 
notion of class, a life-mode should not be regarded 
as an empirical category of human beings, but as a 
concept that designates principally different ways 
of upholding a viable existence (Marx himself was 
ambiguous on this point and never finished the last 
chapter of Capital, in which he begins to elaborate 
what it is that constitutes “class”). The theoretically 
determined life-mode concepts themselves make up 
necessary preconditions for the reproduction of the 
(theoretically determined) modes of production that 
are regarded as necessary in a given social formation. 
The concept of the capitalist mode of production, for 
instance, requires three (concepts of) life-modes 
for its reproduction: an investor life-mode (provid-
ing necessary production apparatus and working 
capital) and two life-modes that contribute to differ-
ent forms of “work”, principally distinct from each 
other. The wage-earner life-mode provides work of 
a predefined kind (requiring more or less skill) and 
the career-professional life-mode contributes unde-
fined ideas and skills that provide a company with 
the necessary innovative edge to put it ahead of com-
petitors, which is key to the survival of the company. 
In general, it can be argued that since the 1980s, 
systemic understandings have fallen victim to an 
increasing interest in agency, “culminating in the 
emergence of postmodernism which often became 
a rejection of all systems” (Carrier 2015: 37)  This 
scholarly development dissolved the view of a con-
cept such as class, as having relevant analytical 
bearing; and, notably, not only when concerned 
with contemporary circumstances. As historian Ga-
reth Stedmann Jones phrased it in 1983, “‘class’ is 
a discursive rather than (...) an ontological reality” 
(Stedman Jones 1983: 7). Historian Patrick Joyce 
furthered this idea, concluding from an analysis of 
nineteenth-century material that, “Other forms of 
the self and of collective identity emerge, long ob-
scured by the concentration on class” (Joyce 1994). 
In general, “class” became disregarded as a primary 
concept for understanding everyday culture, in fa-
vour of concepts such as “identity” that are suppos-
edly more sensitive to empirical complexity (Car-
rier, Kalb & Carbonella 2015: 19; Jul Nielsen 2013b, 
2016). To the extent that the concept of class was re-
garded as a token of a shared, homogenous worker’s 
culture, postmodernism’s critique was correct and 
timely; the self and the social take many forms, and 
relevant are also issues of gender, race and national-
ism (Berlanstein 1993; Boris & Janssens 1999; Boyd 
& McWilliam 1995; Carrier 2015), patterns of at-
titudes (Ambjörnsson 1988; Horgby 1993; Lüdtke 
1986), and many other forms of “the social”. Howev-
er, postmodernism does not provide a possible hier-
archy of the infinite aspects that influence culture; as 
Carrier provocatively puts it (while advocating a re-
newed focus on class and systemic understandings), 
“the drift in anthropology since the 1970s has been 
toward description without analysis… we can be-
gin to ask, once more, not just questions about what 
and how, but also questions about why and where it 
leads” (Carrier 2015: 39f.)
The concept of life-mode includes a multitude 
of relations and social identifications; but with the 
theory’s focus on cultural practices’ ability to re-
produce themselves (and thus a matter of principal 
importance for this article), the basic conditions for 
the continuance of a life-mode has precedence over 
other aspects of the practice. In the case of a wage-
earner life-mode, a theoretical need to create wage-
earner monopolies can be determined. A person who 
lives from the sale of predefined tasks of some sort 
will always be exposed to underselling (since such 
tasks have an abundant supply of labour). Conse-
quently, it is necessary to find a way to monopolize 
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the supply of work to prevent an open competition 
in the commodity of labour. Monopolization can 
take the form of organized unions, but it can also 
rely on informal relations such as groups of work-
ers engaging in a personal relationship with an em-
ployer. Monopolization can imply an avoidance of 
union organization in order to bring together an at-
tractive group of cheap labour, as can be observed in 
some cases with migrant workers (Jul Nielsen 2013b, 
2016; Jul Nielsen & Sandberg 2014). Moreover, wage-
earner monopolies are always in a mutual competi-
tive relation to each other (for an elaboration of the 
concept of wage-earner monopolies, the necessary 
co-existence of inclusion and exclusion that it im-
plies, and the connection to the writings of Marx, see 
Jul Nielsen 2002, 2013a). Thus, no matter the form 
in which we find groups of workers – gendered, na-
tionalistic, diligent, rebellious, etc. – we must be able 
to account for the way in which this cultural pattern 
does not contradict the basic demand to maintain a 
livelihood that is conditioned by some sort of wage-
earner monopoly. Later, we briefly return to how 
state- and life-mode theory not only operates on the 
level of life-modes and modes of production, but – in 
contrast to a Marxian legacy – puts precedence on 
the concept of the state; the state is understood as 
ultimately conditioning the life-modes and thus also 
the practice as a worker.
The scholarly discussions of what constitutes the 
working class as a theoretical concept have regularly 
been entangled in the societal discourse, where the 
use of the notion served to attain influence for left-
wingers, both with and without working-class roots. 
The term “labour”, on the other hand, was often 
used to refer more broadly to ordinary people or “the 
common man”. The “working class” in the public 
discourse is largely a notion that refers to the world 
order that existed prior to the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, and it has disappeared with the decline of 
workers’ discursive influence; symptomatically, the 
notion is regaining usage following Brexit and the 
election of Trump for president, incidents that have 
recreated a political focus on workers.
When bringing in a historical approach it leaps 
to the eye how “labour”, throughout most of the 
twentieth century, and notably in the Keynesian era, 
generally represented a top priority on the political 
agenda. But since the 1980s, labour organisations 
and unions (which moreover as mentioned have a 
declining membership) have generally found them-
selves in a weaker bargaining position when nego-
tiating terms and conditions with the employers’ 
organisations, as governments (leaning on neolib-
eral ideology) have become less inclined to support 
union demands. The weak position of “labour” is 
closely linked with the aforementioned prevalence 
of a neoliberal policy paradigm, and we argue below 
that neoliberalism’s triumphal progress is only un-
derstandable alongside the significant transforma-
tions in the state system. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War constituted – at 
least for a period – a de facto end to an alternative 
to capitalism, as the formerly planned economies 
were integrated into the world economy. With these 
changes, the image of the “working class” as a po-
tential threat vanished. Although for decades a revo-
lutionary prospect had been rather unlikely (despite 
continuous radical rhetoric well into the 1980s), the 
transition, as we argue below, gradually caused a de-
cline in the influence of “labour”. 
Most of the literature on Danish flexicurity re-
volves around the model itself. It deals with its 
historical development, specific elements, latest 
changes, or contemporary opinions on flexicurity 
(Andersen & Hansen 2007; Bredgaard & Kongshøj 
Madsen 2015; Jensen 2015; Keune & Jepsen 2007; 
Mailand 2010, 2015). While these approaches are 
obviously important to understand the model and 
its role in determining working conditions, they 
do not comprehend the preconditions of the model 
in a broader perspective. To grasp the extent of the 
changes of how flexicurity is realized, it is relevant 
to inquire into the transformation of the role of “la-
bour” in a political and ideological context. This is 
not limited to Denmark but applies in general terms 
to Western Europe, although specific forms of wel-
fare politics and of labour market and social or-
ganisation vary across the European states. Through 
such a lens, we may be equipped with an analytical 
tool capable of explaining, in macropolitical terms, 
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why the model has gone through the development it 
has, allowing for a qualified conjecture about future 
prospects.
Labour’s Role in the Post-War Period
Why is it that “labour” played such a prominent role 
on the social agenda from the end of the nineteenth 
century and well into the 1980s? The common an-
swer to this revolves around the industrialization of 
European societies in the second half of the nine-
teenth century that brought about the establishment 
of a new class – the “working class” – forced to sell 
its labour in order to create a sustainable livelihood. 
By organizing collectively, it succeeded in putting 
pressure on employers; and as a result, gradually 
“from below” managed to raise wage and working 
conditions. Though this perspective is not incor-
rect, we argue that to fully understand the rise and 
fall of labour influence during the subsequent more 
than 150 years, it is necessary to include the role of 
the states in which the social partners act. Thus, as 
already touched upon, labour influence is not only 
a matter of a movement “from below”, but also – 
and maybe ultimately conditioned by – recognition 
“from above”. 
As stated previously, our theoretical argument is 
based on the deduction that for a state to hold suf-
ficient strength for recognition externally in the state 
system, there must be an internal endeavour to cre-
ate sufficient cohesion and legitimacy. Thus, the life-
modes (as well as modes of production) that achieve 
the necessary recognition that conditions their en-
durance, such as workers’ right to organize and act 
collectively, are the life-modes that are pivotal for the 
viability of the state. In line with this, we argue that 
states’ struggle for survival in the state system im-
pacts national contexts, including the way in which 
social partners are understood and acknowledged, 
and thus also the relative strength of each partner. 
This theoretical reasoning provides the analysis 
with a conceptual hierarchy: no life-mode or mode 
of production can endure without the recognition of 
the state that ultimately conditions it, whereas a state 
does not necessarily need its life-modes and modes 
of production to survive.
To substantiate the argument empirically, we in-
clude below an example that unambiguously displays 
how “labour” previously held a key political role 
which is principally different from what we find to-
day. The example is explored extensively in the book 
Between High Politics and the Workshop Floor: The 
Danish Worker – Before, During and After the Cold 
War (Jul Nielsen 2004; see also Jul Nielsen 2014), 
where the role of “labour” is examined in relation to 
the strategic concerns of the state from the end of the 
nineteenth century until today by looking at Danish 
history. The example epitomizes in a clear-cut way 
how the political recognition of and influence given 
to one social group – in this case workers – is con-
nected to overall defence and security concerns of 
the state; a connection that will often be of a more 
indirect kind and thus more difficult to apprehend. 
The case in point dates back to 1953, at the height 
of the Cold War, with a NATO conference held in 
Copenhagen. Representatives of the political es-
tablishment were present from all member states: 
Canada, France, Great Britain, Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Turkey, Iceland, Nor-
way, and Denmark – along with the United States, 
the undisputed hegemon of the alliance. The objec-
tive of the conference reveals unmistakably how se-
curity matters concerned not only military power:
NATO [should make up] an efficient manifesta-
tion of the unity of the member states in not only 
military but also, and equally importantly, in 
non-military matters, which touch upon political, 
economic and social problems within the coun-
tries. In the long run, a military defence in itself is 
not sufficient to guard the grounding of Western 
democracy.6
In the mid-1950s, the Cold War was at its height, 
and with both a militarily, politically and ideologi-
cally strong Soviet Union, the West, with the United 
States as the frontrunner, needed much more than 
mere military power to withstand the Eastern threat. 
In the early post-war years, despite criticisms, com-
munism and socialism as alternatives to capitalism 
appealed to millions of people in the West, not least 
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among the working class. There was the risk that 
radical sentiments amongst the populace could turn 
against the established order. Social cohesion within 
civil society was pivotal for the strength of the West-
ern societies; and the radicalism of the 1930s stood 
as a fresh and frightening memory. It is in this con-
text that “labour” assumed a top priority on the po-
litical agenda, a situation that seems highly foreign 
to international politics since the 1990s. The confer-
ence – concerned with youth politics, housing, edu-
cation and a wide range of other topics connected to 
civil society – plainly concluded that integration of 
“labour” was the primary concern, with other issues 
being pushed to the side. In straightforward words 
– characteristically with the American spelling of 
“labor”, this reflecting USA’s stamp on the confer-
ence (where statements and declarations had been 
prepared in advance) – the principal statement of the 
conference was: “The role of labor in world affairs 
has become a key factor.” 
The reasoning behind this unambiguous state-
ment was that “labour” was the target of propaganda 
from the East, and it was among the working popu-
lations that rebellious opinions could gain a stronger 
foothold. Therefore, it is no surprise that the con-
ference concluded that labour organizations and 
labour parties should be provided with profound 
potential to influence society to improve workers’ 
livelihoods. This was regarded as a means to dis-
mantle the critiques of Western capitalism and its 
alleged suppression of the “little man”. Labour rep-
resentatives were given a voice in order to allow for 
“more effective attention to the problems of work-
ers’ standards of living such as purchasing power, 
employment, housing needs… etc.”. As we return to 
below, this strategy paralleled in economic terms the 
priority that Keynesianism – the preferred economic 
tool of the period – put on maintaining a high level 
of employment (with the social unrest of the 1930s 
as contrasting scenario) as well as general attention 
to workers’ demands.7
Thus, the statements from the 1953 NATO con-
ference explicitly reveals how the inclusion of “la-
bour” as a basic pillar in the running of society is 
dependent upon the particular security focus of the 
state (or in this case a coalition of states merged to-
gether by the Eastern counterpart). As said, we are 
well aware that similar unambiguous statements 
cannot necessarily be found in the source material 
in other periods. However, we argue that the accen-
tuated circumstances of the conference reveal a logic 
that has been dominant for over a century, from so-
cialism’s emergence as a potential political threat in 
the second half of the nineteenth century until the 
end of the twentieth century (see Jul Nielsen 2004, 
2013a). To illustrate this, we will present from two 
other transitory periods, two examples that reveal a 
similar pattern:
Across Europe the Paris Commune of 1871 left no 
room for doubt among the political establishment 
that a socialist (or communist) revolt had to be re-
garded as a potential threat. As a result, labour as-
semblies and actions were increasingly perceived in 
this light (Bruun 1938; Jul Nielsen 2002). As is well 
known, the labour movement was gravely divided 
on the question of either a radical revolutionary 
upheaval of capitalist society or a more graduate re-
formism (with the ultimate goal of socialism pushed 
to an undefined future). In general, the European 
states gradually, at the expense of the radicals, rec-
ognized the moderate wings of the labour movement 
that became increasingly influential. As Richard Hy-
man writes, “Trade unions… varied between (and 
often within) countries; but typically, the latter half 
of the nineteenth century saw the more successful 
unions marginalizing or ritualizing their radical-
ism, and seeking understandings with employers on 
the basis of a ‘fair day’s wage for a fair day’s work’” 
(Hyman 2001: 2).
The years following the First World War were 
again marked by mass mobilization among Europe’s 
working populations. The Bolshevik Revolution in 
1917 and subsequent establishment of communist 
parties across Europe (and in the U.S., sparking off 
an intense Red Scare [Levin 1971; Schmidt 2000]) 
underlined the distinction between the moderate 
and the anti-system wing of the labour movement, 
providing the former with convincing arguments for 
improved worker welfare in order to dismantle the 
latter. Thus, the 1920s and 1930s throughout Europe 
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saw an extension of broad social programs in hous-
ing, education, sickness insurance, old age provision, 
etc., similar to what came to mark the post-World 
War Two welfare states. The 1953 NATO conference 
epitomized this shift.
It is important to note that in most European 
countries the threat of a communist or socialist 
takeover was probably never a real possibility; and 
indeed, there was not broad support for communism 
after the invasion of Hungary in 1956. Still, a threat 
of mass mobilisation around socialist ideology was 
an efficient means for “labour” to maintain the sig-
nificant influence. The 1960s and 1970s, despite the 
weakening of communism, were heavily marked by 
radical and revolutionary rhetoric, with persistent 
references to the interests of the “working class” (al-
though often originating in the middle class) that 
maintained the political influence. It was not until 
the collapse of the Eastern bloc that an alternative 
to capitalism ultimately disappeared and entirely re-
moved the threat potential and the possibility of us-
ing this to achieve bargaining power and influence. 
Inner political and ideological cohesion of the state 
as a precondition for external strength no longer re-
lied on “labour” as a defined social group. 
From Keynesianism to Neoliberalism
The shift in the power balance within the state sys-
tem – culminating in the fall of the Soviet empire 
– was also pivotal to the spread of neoliberalism as 
the other major transformation that comprised a 
principal challenge to “labour”. The emergence of 
a neoliberal policy paradigm in the West in the late 
1970s contributed to a continuous weakening of the 
“working class” and thus also a weakening of the 
powers (unions and leftist parties) that advocated a 
strong social security net and worker welfare (Bag-
lioni & Crouch 1990; Crouch 2013; P.A. Hall 1993; 
Rodgers 2011; Streeck 2006).
The analysis of the English path to neoliberalism 
by political economist Peter A. Hall illuminates the 
processes that other European countries also under-
went. Hall enquires into the general steps whereby 
policies change and analyses how a new policy para-
digm emerged in Britain in the late 1970s with Mar-
garet Thatcher coming to power. Parallel to Kuhn’s 
thinking on scientific paradigms (Kuhn 1962), Hall 
describes how a policy paradigm is embedded in the 
terminology used to communicate it. Just as a sci-
entific paradigm is institutionalized in the language 
that reproduces it, a policy paradigm is reproduced 
through the institutions that constitute it. It is not 
until a sufficient amount of anomalies occur that it 
becomes possible to critically analyse the paradigm 
itself. Before that, any criticisms will be targeted to-
wards constitutions within the scientific paradigm, 
not its foundation. Hall describes this in regards 
to policymaking, illuminating the difference be-
tween what he terms first, second, and third order 
changes. First and second order are changes that 
“adjust policy without challenging the overall terms 
of a given policy paradigm, much like ‘normal sci-
ence’”. In contrast, third order changes are “marked 
by radical changes in the overarching terms of policy 
discourse associated with a ‘paradigm-shift’” (Hall 
1993: 281ff.).
Hall argues that the former Keynesian policy 
paradigm fell victim to a third order change. In the 
post-war period, Keynes’ coherent system of ideas 
was institutionalized and applied within the fi-
nancial systems around Europe, “They became the 
prism through which policymakers saw the econo-
my as well as their own role within it” (ibid.: 283ff.). 
However, this economic order did not, as we know, 
sustain itself in the long run. Hall mentions three 
implications that will be present when policy para-
digm changes occur. The first is scientific opposition 
to the existing paradigm, which to some extent must 
also manifest itself politically. Second, Hall points to 
the significance of authoritative figures who actually 
will have the vision and power to advocate for and 
begin the process of implementing the set of new po-
litical and economic ideas. The third implication is 
the accumulation of anomalies within the old para-
digm, which have been dealt with unsuccessfully 
through the methods prevalent in the old paradigm. 
All three conditions were present during the 1970s 
when neoliberalism first entered the scene in Britain. 
Anomalies – for example the simultaneous increase 
in both unemployment and inflation that should not 
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be possible – had accumulated during the past dec-
ades. Such anomalies were unsuccessfully dealt with 
through ad hoc-attempts of changing, for instance, 
the fiscal policies, resulting in an extended distrust 
of the system and paving the way for an alternative 
path (ibid.: 285). In 1974, the neoliberalists Fried-
rich von Hayek and Milton Friedman shared the 
Nobel Prize in Economics; and with such alterna-
tive perceptions of the economy gaining a footing, 
the strong, authoritative figure of Margaret Thatch-
er represented a viable alternative to Keynesianism 
when she was elected in 1979. This evolved into a 
fundamental fight against the labour side during the 
1980s, which would have been virtually unimagina-
ble a few decades earlier when attention to workers’ 
demands was the top political priority as a precau-
tion against societal disintegration. Notably, similar 
occurrences took place in other European countries, 
although typically a few years later and in a less radi-
cal form. 
With neoliberalism comes a whole new set of goals 
and policy instruments that shift the political land-
scape. Several of these instruments directly impact 
conditions pivotal for workers’ livelihood: 
Inflation replaced unemployment as the preemi-
nent concern of policymakers. Macroeconomic 
efforts to reduce unemployment were rejected in 
favour of balanced budgets and direct tax reduc-
tions. Monetary policy replaced fiscal policy as 
the principal macroeconomic instrument, and it 
was reoriented towards fixed targets for the rate 
of monetary growth. Many regulatory instru-
ments associated with state intervention, such as 
incomes policies, exchange controls, and quan-
titative limits on bank lending, were eliminated. 
(Hall 1993)
Neoliberal ideology does not perceive the prosper-
ity of the “working class” as a goal or as a means. 
Instead, it is the belief that the market forces, with 
little or no state intervention, bring balance into the 
economy and thus create the strongest and most re-
sistant society. As Colin Crouch puts it, “neoliberals 
[are]… unequivocally hostile to trade unions, which 
seek to interfere with the smooth operation of the 
labour market” (Crouch 2013: 18). In contrast to 
the Keynesian paradigm, in a neoliberal society the 
state does not have any ideological or instrumental 
incentives to support labour organisations, as they 
are perceived as obstacles to the flourishing of mar-
ket forces.
It is relevant also to point to the disappearance of 
traditional industrial workplaces in Western Europe 
to explain declining labour influence and the lack of 
identification with “the working class”. Overall, dur-
ing the 1970s and 1980s, the Western industrialized 
countries lost their monopoly on global surplus-
extraction. Fordist production processes became 
the source of revenues in non-Western countries, 
most notably in the Asian tiger economies, and 
this pushed the Western economies to improve 
knowledge-content within production to maintain 
a competitive edge, thus safeguarding an adequate 
individual profit margin in the market. The subse-
quent increasing fluidity of capital and spread of lib-
eral trading agreements (advocated by international 
organisations such as the WTO, established in 1995) 
has increased the pace of out-sourcing, off-shoring 
or closures, forcing a reconfiguration of the work-
ing population (Hochschild 2016; Højrup 2017; Jul 
Nielsen 2004; LiPuma & Lee 2004; Sennett 1998, 
2006; Standing 2009). These economic transitions 
are important for the influence of labour but should 
not be seen as independently working “factors”. 
First, the presence of “classic” workplaces is not a 
purely economic matter. During the Keynesian era 
such workplaces were extensively supported by the 
states – well-known examples are shipyards and the 
mining industry. This state support was due to an 
inclination towards economic protectionism as well 
as the fear of the social unrest that would result if 
such companies were to close down in the face of 
pure market forces. Without digging into the caus-
es or probable broader consequences of president 
Trump’s remarkable revitalization of a protectionist 
approach, this situation illuminates how economy 
is not developing per abstract laws but is politically 
conditioned. Further, one could argue that in a way 
Trump has merely adopted measures (and explic-
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itly aimed to give renewed influence to the working 
population) that were widespread until the 1980s, 
when they were neglected in the neoliberal political 
economy, not least (and indeed paradoxically) due to 
American pressure to internationalize and liberalize 
markets.
Second, as specified above, what principally char-
acterizes a wageworker job is not that it is manual 
and takes place at companies with many people; it 
is that the content of the job is predefined (whether 
requiring more or less skill). This is what marks the 
borderline to “knowledge work”, where the basic 
requirement is that the employee contributes unde-
fined ideas and skills that provide the company with 
an innovative edge that competitors do not possess. 
Predefined jobs will always be challenged by under-
pricing if they are not protected (for example by the 
monopolization of them that unions safeguard). 
And, notably, such jobs are not disappearing. They 
are found in large quantities throughout the labour 
market: in retail, service, production, agriculture, 
construction, cleaning, health, etc. If wage and 
working conditions in such occupations are left to 
market forces, a downward spiral is unavoidable; 
just like the Danish flexicurity model’s security di-
mension will further diminish if not prioritized 
politically – without proper political supports only 
flexibility will be left, ultimately leading to social 
dumping.
Danish Flexicurity in the New World Order
Thus, a principal transformation has taken place 
from an overall Keynesian paradigm during the 
Cold War period to the present neoliberal era. Dur-
ing the Cold War period, “labour” played a key role 
as a precondition for social cohesion within the 
Western world. As a consequence, workers’ organi-
zations had a substantial influence on state affairs, 
which made union support a natural choice of the 
individual labourer. Following the collapse of the 
Eastern Bloc, neoliberal ideology and governance 
has succeeded in setting a new agenda. As a conse-
quence, the prevalent view since the 1990s has in-
creasingly been that market concerns are the natural 
nexus around which labour relations should revolve, 
making a political support for worker welfare appear 
to be an artificial inference with mechanisms of the 
market. 
This transformation is crucial for the balance of 
the Danish flexibility model. With a continuous 
weakening of the unions, and with the Danish left-
wing parties (in particular the Social Democratic 
party) moving towards the right, there are fewer 
forces that oppose neoliberal initiatives.8 This pro-
cess has revealed how a balanced flexicurity model 
depends on strong labour representation; and that 
such a state of affairs requires significant political 
support. Denmark’s industrial relations have, as 
mentioned, been built upon negotiations between 
the “independent” social partners, with the govern-
ment on the side-line. And not only have the Danish 
unions traditionally been strong, with high mem-
bership; but the state has also traditionally backed 
up the unions in the negotiations, rather than the 
employers, for reasons discussed previously. 
Not surprisingly considering the transforma-
tions in the role of “labour”, this arrangement is 
also changing. Trade unionists, who have worked 
for years in the labour movement, point to a shift 
in the political inclination to support the worker 
agenda over the employer agenda. In the excerpt be-
low, a Danish union chairman, who has had a long 
trajectory as shipyard worker and shop-steward, fol-
lowed by a career within the labour organisation, 
sums up the way in which the role of state, as one 
of the “legs” in the Danish model, has undergone a 
transition. The interview was conducted in 2011 in 
connection to an inquiry concerning the challenges 
involved in maintaining working conditions despite 
the increased influx of migrant workers from East-
ern Europe to Denmark. However, the union chair-
man more generally reflects on the transformation 
of bargaining power despite the continued adher-
ence to the Danish model of tripartite negotiations.
Even though there will be many in the labour 
movement that will not like what I say now, ac-
tually, the most important system [around the 
Danish model] is not the unions, it is the politi-
cal system! It all depends on having a government 
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and a state that want to play the game; because, 
all the same, the state has the power to play the 
game with other cards, in case it should be neces-
sary. Thus, the weakest leg in the Danish system 
has been the employers. The employer side has 
adapted, but has not been especially active. We 
have historically seen a correlation between the 
trade-union movement and, typically, a Social 
Democratic government… well, also right-wing 
governments… that has built up the Danish mod-
el. Those are the two legs that need to interplay: 
the trade-union movement and the political level; 
if they manage to do that, then the employers will 
adapt automatically. However, if there is no rec-
ognition of this anymore, and much point in that 
direction… well, that is the deathblow to the Dan-
ish model. 
The reasoning of the trade unionist illustrates how a 
particular consensus has been prevalent within the 
Danish model. The government in power – left-wing 
as well as right-wing – has generally been in support 
of the unions, arguably, we could add, as a result 
of the shared consensus about preventing “labour” 
from turning against the social order. Since the end 
of the 1980s, however, with the spread of neoliberal 
ideology, the legitimacy of the (red) trade unions has 
increasingly been questioned; and the monopolistic 
features of the unionized system have been found to 
be too restrictive for a sound economy. 
The unions’ legitimacy as the institutions that 
represent workers has thus suffered a hard blow; and 
it is disclosed that their former strength relied on 
political support “from above”. That they are treated 
today as an obstacle to a smoothly running economy 
is not the result of new political insight but rather 
of the disappearance of “labour” as a political pri-
ority. Moreover, the declining membership (which, 
as shown, is also connected to these changes) put 
the unions in a continuously weaker bargaining 
position, which has made results more difficult to 
achieve – this making future support from the indi-
vidual worker less obvious. 
Concluding Remarks
The Danish flexicurity model has been an integral 
part of the Danish welfare regime for decades. As 
an institution, it has won international recognition 
for its ability to combine a capitalist labour market 
with social security. The European Union has even 
adopted it as a model that it encourages all member 
states to implement. 
However, the otherwise strongly institutionalized 
model is on the verge of change as its security com-
ponent has declined since the 1980s. The article ar-
gues that this transformation was linked to the end 
of the Cold War and the emergence of neoliberalism. 
Our arguments are rooted in a theoretical frame-
work that explains the conditions of social groups 
in a society – such as the “working class” – as closely 
connected to external concerns of the state in ques-
tion. By examining the history of “labour’s” shifting 
importance, it has been demonstrated how the in-
fluence of “labour” has relied on deliberate political 
recognition and support. This support, it is argued, 
has been connected to the potential threat to the so-
cial order that “labour” represented. 
Looking at the Danish flexicurity model in light 
of the above, the decline in the security dimension 
could be expected. The goal of unemployment bene-
fits – namely that people can maintain relatively 
high living standards despite unemployment – be-
comes less valid discursively in a neoliberal para-
digm. Looking ahead, impacts of this development 
are dismal. The more the protection against market 
fluctuations is regarded as an individual challenge 
(perhaps moderated by, politically sensible, active 
labour market policies) and political support to the 
collectivism that the unions represent continues 
to decline, the risk is not only a race to the bottom 
but also that the individual worker cease to regard 
him- or herself as a valued community member and 
citizen. The social dissatisfaction that follows from 
this will, however, not come in the form of a uni-
fied labour movement (lacking its previous support), 
but rather, as can be observed across Europe (Brexit 
being a more recent example of that), materialize as 
frustration, disintegration, and in support for right-
wing nationalism with its supposed protection of the 
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“little man” against globalization. The only way to 
prevent this development is deliberate political sup-
port for the security dimension in today’s labour 
market. 
Notes
 1 Six dimensions have been assigned to the Danish mod-
el: high levels of organization with high coverage of 
collective agreements; nationally coordinated collec-
tive bargaining; a coordinated multi-level system; con-
flict and consensus; voluntarism implying autonomy 
with limited legal regulation; coordination between 
the system of negotiation and the political system (Due 
& Madsen 2006; Larsen & Ilsøe 2016).
 2 Flexicurity as a label originated in Holland in 1995 as a 
political initiative to increase the flexibility of atypical 
types of employment and the security of the atypically 
employed (Andersen 2007; Crouch 2016: 192). Like-
wise, the Danish Model as a label first originated in the 
1990s (Due, Madsen & Jensen 1993).
 3 The concept of flexicurity does not have a universal 
definition. There is a multitude of variations of the 
term which are outlined in Wilthagen’s so-called flexi-
curity-matrice (Bredgaard & Kongshøj Madsen 2015).
 4 It is important to note that if the security component 
of the flexicurity model is removed (or drastically 
retrenched) it may also damage the flexibility, as in-
creased insecurity may force the unions to demand 
employment protection in the form of, for instance, 
redundancy payments.
 5 See chapter “‘The making…’ – af et begreb og en histo-
rie” [“‘The making…’ – of a concept and a history”] in 
Nielsen 2002: 46–49.
 6 Documents from the conference are kept at the Danish 
labour archive (Jul Nielsen 2004). The present excerpt 
is translated from Danish: “at skabe den størst mulige 
gensidige forståelse og solidaritet mellem NATO-lan-
denes folk... NATO (skal gøres til) et effektivt udtryk 
for medlemslandenes fællesskab ikke blot på det mili-
tære, men i lige så høj grad på de civile områder, der 
berører politiske, økonomiske og sociale problemer in-
denfor landene. ... et militært forsvar i sig selv er ikke 
nok til i det lange løb at forsvare den livsform, der er det 
vestlige demokratis”. The following excerpts – which 
are in US English in the original – also stem from this 
archive, unless otherwise stated.
 7 The conclusions at the 1953 NATO conference in Co-
penhagen resemble the general American comprehen-
sion of the situation in the post-war years. In another 
context (within the “Labor Program of the Mutual 
Security Agency”, established after the Second World 
War), a similar understanding is revealed, again epit-
omizing the attention to workers as crucial for West-
ern survival: “We fight Russian communism on three 
fronts: The military, the economic, and the ideologi-
cal. The working class is key to the two latter. If we lose 
there, we will not prevail at the military front” (Boel 
1999:99; translated from Danish). 
 8 In Denmark during the 1990s, social democratic gov-
ernments carried out most of the retrenchments of the 
unemployment benefits (Mailand 2010). The social 
democratic opposition did not manage to stop the re-
trenchments of the benefits in 2010 or effectively roll 
back the reform when elected to govern in 2011. 
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